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<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
Figure 1. Sheep Pig Goat, Wellcome Collection and Fevered Sleep. Image by Ben Gilbert for 
Wellcome 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
How can humans change the way they perceive nonhuman animals? What would it take to see 
animals differently and what role might empathy have in this process? If humans could perceive the 
world from the animals’ point of view, would this change how humans perceive animals and, in 
turn, how they behave towards them? What role might performance play in allowing humans to 
occupy the animal’s world as produced by its specific embodiment – its powers to affect and be 
affected that both differ from and overlap with human worlds (that are themselves differential)? 
And what happens if performance itself is seen from the animal’s perspective? I begin with these 
questions in an attempt to mark out the fundamentally ethico-political stakes of engaging animals in 
performance: the urgent question of how performance might contribute to addressing 
anthropocentrism, speciesism, and the violence towards animal bodies such perspectives enable. In 
my ongoing work, I am interested in the capacity of performance to produce reciprocally 
transformative encounters – in which the affective worlds of both human and nonhuman bodies can 
be un-made and re-made, and wherein “animals are invited to other modes of being, other 
relationships, and new ways to inhabit the human world and to force human beings to address them 
differently.”1 These interests have led me to the project I will focus on here: Sheep Pig Goat (2017) 
by the UK-based performance company, Fevered Sleep – a project in which I played the role of 
“research advisor” when it was first staged in March 2017. I am also collaborating with the 
company to develop a new iteration of this performance which will be hosted at the Vet School at 
the University of Surrey in February 2020.  
 
																																																								
1 Vinciane Despret, “Responding Bodies and Partial Affinities in Human–Animal Worlds,” Theory, Culture & Society, 
December 2013, Vol. 30 (7-8), 51-76, quote on 60. 
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In this article, I consider Sheep Pig Goat alongside the work of foundational animal studies 
scholar and philosopher of science, Vinciane Despret – whose important book, What Would 
Animals Say if We Asked the Right Questions? (2016) was one text amongst many others that the 
company themselves read as part of the preparation for the project. In particular, I draw from 
Despret to explore multiple possible understandings of the notion of “interspecies empathy,” noting 
that, for Fevered Sleep, a core aim of the project was to investigate how performance might 
“increase understanding of, and empathy towards nonhuman animals” (both their own as a 
company and those of the audiences who encounter their work)2. Here, though, the mode of 
empathy I am reaching toward is not one that operates through analogy or identification, but an 
“embodied empathy” that operates as a mode of affective thinking alongside rather than “about” the 
animal, and as a performative encounter between human and nonhuman animals that produces both 
parties anew.  
 
Both embodied empathy and attention have key roles to play in securing greater ethical 
consideration of nonhuman animals in relation to the production of knowledge. As Donna Haraway 
suggests, the etymology of seeing––from the Latin verb respecere, to look again––invites 
consideration of the relationship between attention and respect: to taking care in an ethical sense 
and the careful, iterative act of observation that does not judge on first impressions but considers 
others as worthy of re-spect or, a second look.3 But this ethics of attention is not just about vision or 
sight and this is why performance might play a leading role in its investigation. Rather, as Amanda 
Boetzkes has argued, if “the fundamental ethical question” concerns “how we might develop a 
complex sensibility of and for non-human animals”4 or, if ethics is a matter of embodied behaviors 
improvised between actors in the uncertainty of specific contexts, then performance practices surely 
have much to contribute to the development of our understanding of what constitutes an 
interspecies ethics. Interspecies performance practice might be understood as a primary domain for 
the creation and investigation of what Traci Warkentin also describes as “an ethical praxis of paying 
attention.”5 But whereas Warkentin’s work foregrounds notions of attention primarily informed by 
phenomenology, my own engagement has been shaped by both Bergson and Deleuze, and in this 																																																								
2 David Harradine, David and Laura Cull Ó Maoilearca, “Interview with David Harradine,” unpublished email 
interview, December 2018. 
3 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 19. My thinking is 
informed not only by Haraway here, but by Matthew Goulish of the US-based company Every house has a door, who 
discussed the notion of re-spect as looking again in a lecture as part of the Abandoned Practices summer school in 
Prague in 2012. 
4 Amanda Boetzkes, “Art,” in Turner, Lynn, Sellbach, Undine and Broglio, Ron (eds), The Edinburgh Companion to 
Animal Studies (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2018), quote on 79. 
5 Traci Warkentin, “Interspecies Etiquette: An Ethics of Paying Attention to Animals,” Ethics and the Environment, 
Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2010), 101–21. 
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sense has a greater philosophical affinity with thinkers like Despret and Haraway who posit the 
primacy and constitutive nature of relation, rather than thinking in terms of things related (even 
when things are “themselves”). As Haraway puts it in When Species Meet: “The partners do not 
precede the meeting; species of all kinds, living and not, are consequent on a subject- and object-
shaping dance of encounters.”6 
 
The notion of the encounter, then, is fundamental not only ontologically but ethically. It is 
also the name that Fevered Sleep gave to the meetings between the improvising human performers 
and the sheep, pigs, and goats that form the central interspecies conversation of their project. 
Famously, for Deleuze, the “encounter” signals an event of non-recognition: a becoming of 
embodied thought with its “outside” as distinct from our tendency to engage with other worlds and 
lives through habitual modes of representation and pre-existing ideas (or “images of thought”).7 A 
key issue raised by Sheep Pig Goat is the barriers or blockages that are presented to encounters, or, 
more precisely, greater degrees of co-constitutive relation, particularly on the “human” side whether 
in terms of our tendencies to infantilize, sentimentalize, or anthropomorphize non-humans (though 
this article will also touch on a more positive or reciprocal conception of anthropomorphism in due 
course).  
 
Recent years have seen an exciting surge of new scholarship and practice in interspecies 
performance. Moving away from using nonhuman animals in theatre and performance as metaphors 
for human concerns or as aesthetic short-cuts to a certain reality effect, contemporary interspecies 
performance research investigates, for example, to what extent performance might be something 
that humans make for nonhuman animal audiences, allowing humans to see the world from the 
animals’ point of view. But what can performance offer to the understanding and practice of an 
ethical approach to knowing nonhuman animals? What constitutes an ethical way of knowing 
nonhuman animals and how can it be practiced in and as interspecies performance? 
 
Fevered Sleep’s Sheep Pig Goat offers two examples of how this ethical way of knowing 
might be performed. Firstly, the company’s use of improvisation as an open-ended form of 
embodied and nonverbal questioning potentially allows the nonhuman animals to transform the 
human dancers and musicians understanding of performance itself. I draw parallels here between 
this idea and Despret’s call to researchers to allow animals greater degrees of agency in the 
production of knowledge about them: to consider what animals would say if they were asked the 																																																								
6 Haraway, When Species Meet, 4. 
7 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994). 
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questions that matter to them, rather than those that seem to matter from the human point of view. 
Secondly, their project engages with a form of embodied empathy: understood as a felt knowledge 
of the differential continuity between humans and nonhumans, rather than as an empathy through 
analogy that operates through a one-way anthropomorphic projection. Again, I turn to Despret to 
make links between the role of bodily knowledge in performance practices and the fieldwork of 
ethologists. In approaching the project in this way, I do not mean to hold up the first iteration of 
Sheep Pig Goat as some sort of ethical ideal––something that the company themselves would be the 
first to question and challenge. Rather, I foreground this project in all its ethical complexity because 
the question of the ethics of human knowledge of and co-existence with nonhuman animals is 
fundamental to Fevered Sleep’s work and indeed a distinctive feature of the new forms of 
interspecies performance emerging today.  
 
Throughout the essay I return to the idea of a reciprocally transformative interspecies 
encounter in contrast to the problem of inclusion by analogy or resemblance: wherein a concept, 
category or domain (whether “performance,” “empathy,” “knowledge,” or the domain of equality or 
rights itself) is ostensibly extended to include nonhuman animals but only by a gesture of 
appropriation of the other into the same, rather than the transformation of the category itself through 
the encounter with the other. For example, critics have already argued that it is not enough to 
merely quantitatively increase the domain of contemporary morality in order to include a greater 
number of individuals––as animal rights advocate Peter Singer’s “expanding circle” model seems to 
propose.8 Rather, we need new ethical models that do not rely on principles of resemblance: where 
nonhuman animals are afforded rights only to the extent that they can be asserted to be “just like 
us.” There is a double-bind to this scenario: one in which humans are torn between the welfare 
benefits likely associated with the extension of legal rights to nonhumans, but at the same time 
skeptical of their underlying logic which reinforces rather than challenges the presumed moral 
superiority of humans. This is a double-bind that requires us to think difference and continuity, 
heterogeneity and commonality together, rather than as mutually exclusive. 
 
Presumption of ontological difference leads to the justification of different moral treatment. 
And yet, in the case of nonhuman animals (and other oppressed groups), there is also the 
phenomenon of shifting goal posts. That is, humans’ need to assert their moral privilege tends to 
mean that as soon as cross-species continuity is demonstrated with respect to a given quality or 
competency (like reason, emotion or language), the lines are redrawn between the nonhuman 																																																								
8 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981). 
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version of the quality and its “properly” human counterpart. In this context, those seeking to 
improve the ethical consideration shown to nonhuman animals have the choice between playing the 
game of proof (the rules of which will continue to change) or making the case for equality on the 
grounds of differential continuity (or a continuum of difference): the shared yet heterogeneous 
nature of human and nonhuman animal worlds.9 My concern here, and more broadly, is in what 
making the case for interspecies equality might involve, insofar as it may not be most effectively 
considered as entirely a matter of logical argument so much as an embodied act.  As I’ll try to 
suggest in what follows, Fevered Sleep’s Sheep Pig Goat offers an instance of how interspecies 
performance can solicit affective shifts in embodied perception that might also lead to behavioral 
change. 
 
 
2.  Fevered Sleep’s Sheep Pig Goat 
 
In 2017, I was a research advisor on Sheep Pig Goat, a project by Fevered Sleep, commissioned by 
the Wellcome Collection as part of their year-long Making Nature program. The project explored 
the relationship between perception and knowledge in human-animal relationships, along with all 
the attendant issues of mastery, anthropomorphism, and anthropocentrism inevitably raised by the 
human production of knowledge about animals. Described by the company as a “creative research 
studio,” Sheep Pig Goat involved a week-long public presentation of “a series of improvised 
encounters between human performers and animal spectators:” specifically, sheep, pigs, and goats. 
Originally, the idea was to make a performance for an animal audience staged in the galleries at the 
Wellcome, an idea that echoes projects like Laurie Anderson’s Concert for Dogs (2010) or even 
more historic examples like the orchestral concert that was put on for the “captive audience” of a 
pair of Indian elephants in the Jardin des Plantes in eighteenth-century Paris.10 The company 
gradually moved away from this idea, however, in favor of plans for a project which would offer 
human visitors what co-director David Harradine describes as a space in which to “properly, 
respectfully and carefully observe animals watching a performance and reflect and report back on 
what they’ve seen, whether it’s the body language of a pig or a goat.”11 For Harradine: “humans do 
a really bad job of paying attention,” and so the project was conceived as giving both the company 
																																																								
9 I discuss the idea of a non-oppositional relationship between difference and continuity in more philosophical detail at 
the end of my book Theatres of Immanence (London; New York: Palgrave, 2013), see 234–38. 
10 Walter Putnam, “Captive Audiences: A Concert for the Elephants in the Jardin des Plantes,” TDR: The Drama 
Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, Spring 2007, 154–60 
11 David Harradine quoted in Lyn Gardner, “Sheep Pig Goat: Theatre for an Audience of Animals,” The Guardian, 
Theatre Blog, first published Wednesday 15 March 2017, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2017/mar/15/sheep-pig-goat-theatre-show-for-animals 
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and a wider public the opportunity to attend to animals, as themselves, engaged in processes of 
attending, rather than as the mere objects of human observation.  
 
In particular, Harradine implies, humans have become highly selective in our perception of 
human-animal commonality not least, perhaps, on account of the demanding new ethical 
responsibilities such a perception might raise. In this sense, it may be less a matter of how much 
attention humans pay to animals, and more about how attending is performed (or how attention 
itself is understood). The kind of attention that Sheep Pig Goat invites is not attention 
conventionally understood as an immobilizing gaze or a process of selection and exclusion. Rather, 
it is an expanded, bodily attention to animals that differs from the everyday insofar as it does not 
“turn away from what it has a material interest in not seeing.”12 As Fevered Sleep co-director Sam 
Butler notes, it is not that humans are poor at attending to animals per se, but that they attend to 
some animals more closely than others in order to suit their own needs.13 
 
In order to go at least some way to allow the performance-based research to speak for itself, 
I would now like to invite readers to watch the company’s film of the project first before reading on. 
 
<EMBED SHEEP PIG GOAT FILM HERE> 
 
 Founded in 1996 by Harradine and Butler, Fevered Sleep has created over thirty different 
projects of which Sheep Pig Goat is not the first to engage with animality. As the company describe, 
Sheep Pig Goat came “on the back of a number of projects where we’ve found ourselves in the 
presence of animals or we’ve somehow wanted their presence in our work.”14 An Infinite Line: 
Brighton (2008), for instance, was “an exploration of and response to the quality of natural light in 
Brighton,” a performance which featured a white spotted stallion, Phoenix, owned by the same 
handlers who provided the animals for Sheep Pig Goat.15 But whilst the live horse who appeared in 																																																								
12 Henri Bergson, “The Perception of Change” in Henri Bergson: Key Writings, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson and 
John Mullarkey (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 303–27, quote on 309. 
13 Butler notes: “There’s a hierarchy around which animals are welcome in our houses and onto our laps and into our 
beds sometimes, and the ones that we feel an urgency around taking care of and really observing what their needs are 
and drawing comfort from, and so that relationship serves us, but because it serves us we therefore care for them; and 
then there are the other animals that we have a really close relationship with but for other reasons, and that is the other 
need that we have for them which is to do with eating meat or the desire I should say, to eat them. And so we have a 
relationship with them in different ways, or maybe most of us don’t have a relationship with them and that’s the point” 
Sam Butler quoted in Fevered Sleep and Laura Cull Ó Maoilearca, “On Sheep Pig Goat: An Interview with Fevered 
Sleep,” unpublished interview transcript, recorded February 7, 2019, edited version available as a podcast at: 
https://soundcloud.com/laura-cull-o-maoilearca/on-sheep-pig-goat-an-interview-with-fevered-sleep 
14 David Harradine, quoted in Fevered Sleep and Laura Cull Ó Maoilearca, “On Sheep Pig Goat: An Interview with 
Fevered Sleep.” 
15 Harradine, David, Invisible Things: Documentation from a Devising Process, created in collaboration with Synne 
Behrndt and Valle Walkley (London: Fevered Sleep, 2011). 
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this early work was arguably there as a kind of stand-in, a metaphor for the extraordinary 
indifference of the natural phenomena that the performance hoped to be about, the animals in Sheep 
Pig Goat move well beyond operating as mere vehicles for human expression. In turn, the project 
could also be situated alongside projects such as The Weather Factory (2010) and It’s the Skin 
You’re Living In (2012), which, as Lisa Woynarski has outlined, “highlight and critique our 
relationship to ecological conditions such as global climate change” and “gesture towards a non-
anthropocentric performance aesthetic.”16 The latter, for example, is a multi-format film project that 
features “a man dressed like… a polar bear” as he undertakes “a fragmented journey from the 
northern reaches of Europe, through Scotland, to the south of the UK.”17 
 
As documented in the film, the first iteration of Sheep Pig Goat took place in March 2017, 
in a London warehouse trying to be as much like a barn as possible. The animals involved were 
chosen for their familiarity with human contact and were transported to the site from a farm in 
Wales, along with their handlers, who supervised all aspects of the animals’ participation in the 
project and were present for all of the encounters with the principle function of attending to the 
animals’ welfare. They included three sheep, two female Tamworth pigs (who are kept by their 
handlers for breeding) and a group of four rescued goats (all adolescent males).18 The human 
performers included a bass clarinetist, a viola player, a double bassist, a singer, and two 
contemporary dancers, all of whom the directors described as offering a kind of “toolbox” for the 
unknown requirements of the work to come: all expert improvisers, all expert non-verbal 
conversationalists, valued by the directors for their heightened competencies in relational 
attentiveness.  
  
 It has become commonplace to define a performance practice as “research” according to, 
amongst other things, the criteria of “questioning.” Sheep Pig Goat does exactly this: both in terms 
of explicit research questions expressed in human verbal language, but also in the nonverbal and 
bodily forms of questioning it performs. Situated in a professional arts rather than an academic 
context, pre-show framing nevertheless took great care to manage audience expectations by making 
clear that what they were coming to see was a public staging of the research process itself, not an 
entertaining show or finished piece. The project framed itself as a use of performance to investigate 
a series of questions, including: “how well do humans see animals as they really are – not as we tell 
ourselves they are?;” and “what do animals perceive, when they perceive us?” The vexed question 																																																								
16 Lisa Woynarski, ‘A House of Weather and a Polar Bear Costume’, Performance Research, 20:2 (2015), 24-32, quote 
on 24. 
17 Fevered Sleep website, available at http://www.feveredsleep.co.uk/films/its-the-skin-youre-living-in/ 
18 None of the animals involved in the project were destined for slaughter for human consumption. 
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of anthropomorphism and to what extent we can know animals “as they really are” is something 
that I will return to. But for now, I want to emphasize the ways in which questions were a key part 
of how the encounters were structured. For Harradine, his and Butler’s role in the project as co-
directors was: “to create frameworks for the encounters, and to set tasks or targets for the 
performers, in an open-ended, non-directed way – through questions: What happens if…? Can you 
see how…? Is there any…? Could you…?”19 But then ultimately, and crucially, he suggests that: “It 
is the animals who direct us to ‘direct’ the performers.”20 In this scenario, then, it is not just the 
artist-researcher who might be posing the questions that guide the research. Rather, we also need to 
consider what questions the animals themselves might have been posing; what questions did the 
sheep, pigs, and goats have about the behavior of these creatures with whom they found themselves 
sharing space and time? If current conventions mean that Sheep Pig Goat can be recognized as 
research because it asks questions, then the reason it is research that matters is because it is an 
exercise in trying to ask animals the right questions––to ask them the questions that allow them to 
speak, rather than the questions that silence or predetermine answers in advance, circularly. Not, 
yes/no questions: “Can animals perform? Can a goat dance? Are animals capable of the kinds of 
deliberate, conscious, chosen activity that would allow us to grant them the status of genuine 
performers?” But “and-and” questions: “How can we hear the animals’ own questions?” and “how 
might animals change our very idea of questioning itself?” In this sense, this project is not a “use” 
or application of performance to animal research, but a kind of animalizing of both performance 
and research. 
 
This questioning also takes place in and as the improvisational practices of the participating 
dancers and musicians. Naturally, the performers began with what they knew: techniques of 
structured play, call and response, embodied invitation, and listening. Improvisation offers rich 
resources for the enactment of ethical approaches to knowledge-production of nonhuman animals: 
allowing performers to hold themselves in states of heightened openness and responsiveness to the 
continuity and difference of other bodies, and employing strategies to approach creation (of 
movement or sound) as a fundamentally relational process emerging from unpredictable qualities of 
specific encounters rather than from individual authorial intention. However, even if improvisation 
processes like contact improvisation in dance and free improvisation in music are ostensibly 
concerned with novelty and “detraining,”21 they are also matters of technique and expertise: 
practices in which performers can find themselves settling into habits or styles as much as in other 																																																								
19 David Harradine, Unpublished correspondence with the author, 2018. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Steve Paxton quoted in Bojana Cvejić, Choreographing Problems: Expressive Concepts in European Contemporary 
Dance and Performance (London; New York: Palgrave, 2015), 136–7. 
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modes of creative production. No matter how much Sheep Pig Goat had been set up as a “research 
studio” rather than a show, both the performers and the directors experienced some degree of 
pressure to perform according to stereotypical ideas of what counts as aesthetically pleasing or 
interesting behavior from a human point of view; their actions were initially shaped by a variously 
conscious awareness of the possible expectations of the human audience. This is the first 
destabilizing demand on the performers. In post-Encounter discussions, dancer Kip Johnson spoke 
about the shift between encountering his own ego in performance in the moment of internally 
evaluating his own movements to the dissolution of these values in the attempt to see himself from 
the animals’ point of view.22 As I will return to later, there is then a second demand: that the action 
is not about performing “for” either the human or nonhuman animal audience according to existing 
ideas of what that act involves, but a sharing of the modes of action that might emerge in and as a 
more reciprocally transformative encounter. Performance does not precede but is produced by the 
encounter; dancer and pig co-create each other. 
 
 So, what happened during Sheep Pig Goat? “Very little happened actually,” Butler says23. 
And she is right: there was something of the self-reflexive humor of failure of Marcus Coates’s 
work here too; a wry smile as humans catch a glimpse of their own desperation for contact with an 
other who appears more interested in what there might be to eat, and in her fellow pig, than with 
anything a human might be doing.24 The animals in Sheep Pig Goat were invited to be observers of 
the human performers on their own terms: an invitation which they often appeared to take up 
precisely by largely ignoring them. But if from one perspective “very little happened,” it is also that 
a lot happened. And indeed, it is because such a multiplicity of happenings took place, that no 
single response has the power to sanction the meaning of the event as a whole. When we ask, 
“What happened?” the response must take the form of an addition rather than a reduction. And-and. 
 
 <INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE> 
Figure 2. Sheep Pig Goat, Wellcome Collection and Fevered Sleep. Image by Ben Gilbert for 
Wellcome 
 																																																								
22 Kip Johnson reflected: “I think I am definitely learning that I have been conditioned to be affected, or wanting to 
please the people watching. I’m realizing quite how deeply embedded that is in me.” See Kip Johnson, “Sheep Pig Goat 
Conversation – 11th December 2017,” unpublished transcript of conversation between the artistic directors of Fevered 
Sleep and their performers who were part of Sheep Pig Goat. In future, the transcript will be publicly available in the 
Sheep Pig Goat archive held by the Wellcome Collection in London, UK. 
23 Sam Butler, unpublished remarks during Interspecies Performance: a workshop held at the University of Surrey in 
May 2018. 
24 Here, I am thinking of works by Coates such as the photograph, Goshawk (Self-Portrait) (1999) and the video work, 
Sparrow Hawk Bait (1999) which I discuss in Theatres of Immanence. 
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What happened? Sheep Pig Goat was a demonstration of performance’s epistemic force, a 
project that foregrounds performance as a mode of inquiry. But it was also a project from which the 
directors emerged speaking not of a contribution to knowledge but of an “abyss of ignorance.”25 It 
was a site of learning but it was also one of unlearning. Although, perhaps, having exited the 
paradigm of mastery, there is no reason why research might not be defined––as Despret suggests––
as aiming to make the world more rather than less strange to us. From this perspective, Sheep Pig 
Goat appears as one way to respond to Despret’s call “to learn to encounter animals as if they were 
strangers, so as to unlearn all of the idiotic assumptions that have been made about them.”26 Indeed, 
as I sat in the encounters, I thought: If I sit here for long enough, perhaps I can unlearn the 
subtractive perception that allows me to see “the identity of animals as reducible to species 
membership.”27 Perhaps I can learn to see this sheep, not a sheep. And I thought: Perhaps if a 
certain kind of scientist sat here for long enough she might unlearn to see animals as limited to 
reactions, and in so doing create the possibility that animals might surprise the researcher who asks 
questions of them, breaking the circle of only encountering what extant knowledge has already 
predicted.28	
 
 What happened? There is the difference between what happened to/for the performers who 
were there with the animals every day, and what happened for the visitors who, for the most part, 
only observed a single encounter. In this context, for instance, the singer described what was for her 
“a moment of sheer accomplishment” likely unnoticed by most of the visitors when the sheep “were 
comfortable enough to turn away while we were making sounds… that was so significant.”29 
 
What happened? A radical indeterminacy that functioned not just as a screen for 
anthropocentric projections (moving unilaterally from us to them), but as a site of a two-way 
movement. There were multiple knowledges projected onto the animal; at times, a given voice 
intervened to put an end to doubt. One of the handlers says to a dancer: “The pig is making that 
noise, because she doesn’t like you moving in between her and the other pig. She’s barking because 
you’re getting too close.” But something moved in the other direction too. Such moments felt like a 
kind of progress. As potential markers of appearance rather than the animals’ indifference to the 
																																																								25	David Harradine, unpublished remarks during Interspecies Performance, May 2018.	
26 Vinciane Despret, What Would Animals Say If We Asked the Right Questions? translated by Brett Buchanan, 
(Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 161. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Ibid., 39. 
29 Sterre Maier, “Sheep Pig Goat Conversation - 11th December 2017,” unpublished transcript. 
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performers but also as (de-romanticizing) reminders that encounters hold the possibility of conflict, 
such that the dance that follows becomes a choreography of negotiation. How close is too close?30   
 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE> 
Figure 3. Sheep Pig Goat, Wellcome Collection and Fevered Sleep. Image by Ben Gilbert for 
Wellcome 
 
2.1 Performance for animal audiences 
 
In foregrounding the notion of the nonhuman as the bearer of attention, Sheep Pig Goat could be 
seen in the context of a wider set of practices concerned to explore the idea of making performance 
for nonhuman animals as spectators or audiences: from Anderson’s Concert for Dogs, Tuija 
Kokkonen’s A Performance with an Ocean View (with a Dog/for a Dog) — II Memo of Time (2008), 
to the ongoing Performances for Pets (2014) project in which artists Krõõt Juurak and Alex Bailey 
“present bespoke performances for pets in their familiar environment.”31 As the artists note: 
Animals have been entertaining humans throughout the ages in circuses and zoos, 
entertainment by pets has overtaken the Internet, every pet is in a sense a 
performer for humans.  We wanted to reverse the roles and offer the animals the 
position of the viewer. When it comes to performing and being interesting pets are 
superior to us in several ways. When a pet comes on stage, for example they 
instantly capture everyone’s attention. So the inspiration for the performance was 
really a “what if” we reversed the roles for a moment. Making this performance 
has enabled us to see the world from the pets’ point of view and we are hoping to 
learn from them. And we also wanted to expand our audience across species.32 
In the case of Juurak and Bailey, the transformative work is less focussed on the humans living 
alongside the “pets” and more focussed on their own perception as performance-makers: often 
using imitation as the starting point for embodied empathy and becoming with their particular 
animal audiences. This is no easy identification though. Given the different world their sensory 
powers performatively produce, it seems likely, as Jessica Ulrich suggests, that the cats and dogs 
are experiencing the performances by Juurak and Bailey “in many ways that are inaccessible for 
																																																								
30 Despret, What Would Animals Say, 17. 
31 Juurak and Bailey’s use of the term “pet” here, rather than Haraway’s now widely used term “companion species,” 
might be jarring for some. However, as the description here and interviews elsewhere suggest, the artists’ practice very 
much aligns with the notion of domestication as reciprocal transformation that one finds in Haraway, rather than 
reasserting any species hierarchy that might be construed as intrinsic to the notion of animals as “pets.”  
32 Krõõt Juurak and Alex Bailey, “Q&A,” available at http://www.performancesforpets.net/info. 
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humans.”33 Indeed, when asked in an interview about what “the most eventful thing” was that had 
happened during the Performance for Pets project, the artists politely decline to answer. Polite, that 
is, in Despret’s sense insofar as they seek to acknowledge that what counts as an “event” will differ 
amongst species. They add instead: “We feel it would be unfair to point out some moments that 
seemed like events to us. Only the pets will know of the most eventful moments for them.”34  
 
Sheep Pig Goat likewise calls to mind the broader traditions of “art for animals” as 
discussed by art historians like Ulrich and Matthew Fuller, which take us back to works such as 
Wolf Kahlen’s 1977 scent-based exhibition for dogs Dog Territory, or to new works in interspecies 
film such as Rachel Mayeri’s Primate Cinema: Apes as Family (2011). In the case of Kahlen’s 
piece, Ulrich emphasises the new demands that an animal audience might make on the skills of the 
human artist, noting that “Scents are doubtless more interesting to dogs than paintings. But this 
means in this case that an amateur creates for an expert audience.”35 Of course, the same applies for 
the researcher: in my case, a near complete sense of incompetence to account for the experience of 
a key set of participants in the performance I am seeking to analyse. Interspecies performance 
demands new competencies of us all that cannot be developed overnight. 	
The starting point for many of these works is a simultaneously playful and serious interest in 
the ethico-political implications of a reversal of roles wherein the nonhuman animals who have so 
often been objects of the human gaze, including for the purposes of entertainment, are 
acknowledged as subjects of their own perspective: specifically as neglected spectators of aesthetic 
events. But there is clearly no necessary emancipatory dimension to the reversal in itself: no 
guarantee of any revaluation of values through the sheer act of positioning of animals as audiences. 
Indeed, as Ulrich discusses with respect to Annika Kahrs’ 2013 piece Playing to the Birds, such 
reversals can serve to reinforce anthropocentrism.  For her part, Ulrich argues that “Art that 
confronts animals with human paintings or plays human music to animals stays deeply 
anthropocentric and clings to a value system animals usually cannot relate to.”36 In Kahrs’ piece, for 
instance, Franz Liszt’s Legend Number 1. Sermon to the birds by Saint Francis of Assisi (1863) is 
performed to an audience of caged birds in a concert hall. As Ulrich suggests, the emphasis is very 
much on “the musical preaching of an all too human convention of music,” rather than any 
																																																								
33 Jessica Ulrich, “Art for Animal Audiences,” pesented at Sophiensaele, Berlin on the occasion of Animal Forms & 
Formulas – On the human-animal-relation in contemporary performance, October 1, 2017, available at 
http://www.performancesforpets.net/text; accessed June 1, 2019. 
34 Juurak and Bailey, “Q&A.” 
35 Ulrich, “Art for Animal Audiences.” 
36 Ibid. 
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responsiveness to the birds’ themselves who have no choice (it seems) but to listen from their 
confinement.37  
 
If there has been an increase in artists making work for animal audiences, then there has 
simultaneously been a growth of interest in the possibility of using the arts to give humans the 
chance to experience what is framed as “the animal’s point of view,” including by animal rights 
organizations banking on the capacity of empathy to create behavioral change (despite others 
concerns for its long-term political efficacy). For example, PETA have launched a series of VR 
based works including I, Chicken (2014), a VR experience which they claim “allows people to view 
life from a chicken’s perspective before being sent to slaughter,” and I, Orca (2015), also 
specifically sold as an “empathy-building” project, which “uses wireless Google virtual reality 
goggles to immerse participants in a world where they can swim freely in the ocean with their orca 
family.”38 A more formally interesting project from this perspective is Cleary Connolly’s Meta-
Perceptual Helmets (2015): a series of head pieces designed to help human museum visitors “to see 
the world the way hammerhead sharks, giraffes, horses and chameleons see it.”39 Inspired by 
research undertaken at the turn of the twentieth century by psychologist George M. Stratton, the use 
of mirrors inside the helmets gives at least some kind of embodied experience of the relative nature 
of human perception. According to the artists: “The hammerhead helmet lets the wearer see 360 
degrees except for a blind spot right in the center of its vision, which is resolved by swinging the 
head from side to side like hammerheads do. The chameleon helmet has independently-rotational 
eyes like the lizard which allow the user to look at two objects at the same time. The giraffe helmet 
puts the eyes above the helmet while the horse helmet lets the user see what’s coming from 
behind.”40 But whilst both of these projects arguably place an undue emphasis on vision and on the 
idea of animal perception as simply a different way of seeing (or point of view on) an objective 
world, Despret’s work emphasizes the notion of the animal’s point of view as a world. Drawing 
from von Uexküll’s well-known notion of the Umwelt, Despret suggests that it is not that the animal 
perceives “this” world differently, but performatively produces and inhabits a different (albeit to 
varying degrees parallel, overlapping, or “associated”) world on the grounds of its particular powers 
of perception and affection.41 In turn, this move from thinking in terms of perspective on a world to 
affective worlding indicates an important role for embodied empathy as a mode of felt knowledge 
(and unknowing) in relation to nonhuman animals. 																																																								
37 Ibid. 
38 PETA website, available at https://www.peta.org/about-peta/milestones/ 
39 See the artists’ website for further information: http://www.connolly-cleary.com/Home/helmets 
40 Paul Seaburn, “Helmets Help Humans See Like Hammerheads and Horses,” Mysterious Universe, published January 
9, 2015, available at https://mysteriousuniverse.org/2015/01/helmets-help-humans-see-like-hammerheads-and-horses/  
41 Despret, What Would Animals Say, 161–7. 
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2.2 On (embodied) empathy 
 
 The question of the potential role of empathy in the production of knowledge about 
nonhuman animals is a long and hotly debated subject, not least on account of the problems 
associated with “empathy by identification,” or what Wendy Rose calls, “the tourism of the soul.”42 
In this context, Despret’s work contributes a valuable inventory of some of the diverse range of 
“empathic postures” enacted by animal scientists in the course of their research, in ways that, I’d 
argue, provide a productive cross-disciplinary context for a consideration of Sheep Pig Goat (as 
well as pointing toward potential lines of future enquiry into ethological fieldwork as 
performance).43 Cognitive ethologist and canine behavior expert, Mark Bekoff, for instance, claims 
that he “can feel what animals are feeling,” and that, on account of mirror neurons, “this emotional 
empathy seems to be innate.”44 In contrast, Despret argues for an “empathy without pathos”45 of 
renowned animal scientist and autistic spokesperson, Temple Grandin, who does not claim that her 
own feelings allow her to know what animals feel, but that she thinks like an animal: visually, and 
in details. Grandin suggests that the world appears to her (as it does to cows, she claims) “as a 
swirling mass of tiny details” such that she is in a position to provide other humans (like 
slaughterhouse designers) with access to how the world appears to animals, whose behavior, 
particularly their fear, otherwise remains mysterious (troublesome, expensive…) to them.46 
Notoriously, Grandin’s practice involves using her own body to perform a literalization or 
embodied enactment of the empathic gesture. For her, as Despret outlines, one cannot understand 
animals “‘unless you put yourself in their place – literally in their place. You have to go where the 
animal goes, and do what the animal does’ in order to see what it sees and understand what scares 
it.”47 
 
 For her part, Despret insists on multiple understandings of empathy in animal contexts––
beyond a conventional understanding of empathy as feeling what the animal feels––as well as a 
differentiation between the purposes and approaches of a range of empathetic practices (from 
Grandin and Bekoff’s, to those of female primatologists like Shirley Strum and Barbara Smuts). In 																																																								
42 Wendy Rose quoted in Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free 
Association Books, 1991), 113. 
43 Vinciane Despret ‘Responding Bodies and Partial Affinities in Human–Animal Worlds’, Theory, Culture & Society, 
December 2013, Vol. 30 (7-8), 51–76, quote on 58. 
44 Marc Bekoff, The Emotional Lives of Animals (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2007), 128. 
45 Despret, “Responding Bodies,” 59. 
46 Ibid., 58. 
47 Ibid., 59. 
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her work on the interactions between the human bodies of scientists and the animals they seek to 
observe and come to know through fieldwork in the context of ethological research, Despret 
foregrounds the notion of “embodied empathy:” “a concept which describes feeling/seeing/thinking 
bodies that undo and redo each other, reciprocally though not symmetrically, as partial perspectives 
that attune themselves to each other.”48 Notions of embodied empathy provide important resources 
for thinking and practicing empathy beyond analogy or resemblance. In particular Despret’s 
account of embodied empathy as a process of bodily questioning supports my own sense of the 
function of improvisation in Sheep Pig Goat. 
 
For Despret, interspecies empathy does not imply experiencing with one’s own body what the 
nonhuman animal experiences, “but rather creat[es] the possibilities of an embodied 
communication.”49 Specifically, Despret talks about empathy as a “tool that attunes bodies,” but one 
that needs to be reinvented or redefined in each new affective context.50 This embodied empathy, 
she suggests, might be understood as “the process by which one delegates to one’s body a question, 
or a problem, that matters and that involves other beings’ bodies. Bodies are articulating, and 
become articulated, in the asking and in its responses.”51 Elsewhere she specifically evokes this as a 
process of learning to think with animals, rather than about them as objects––processes which may 
or may not proceed through methods of imitation or seeking to act “as if” one were that animal. 
Furthermore, the unlearning and active forgetting of presumed knowledge is an important feature of 
this methodology. That is, for Despret, interspecies empathy involves both an unlearning of how to 
think according to pre-existing assumptions (in which knowledge about the animal is merely applied 
to it), and the experimental production of new modes of thought alongside animals, undertaken 
particularly––though not exclusively––through the body.52 Conventionally anthropomorphism is 
understood as an intellectual, voluntary projection of the image of the human onto the animal, 
according to a kind of fantasy identification. In contrast, both these perspectives suggest that who 
humans are as biological beings––including any images of themselves as social, empathetic beings–
																																																								
48 Ibid., 51. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 71. 
51 Ibid., 70. 
52 For Despret, it is not that there is one way or a single approach that would allow us to see the world from an animal’s 
perspective. In this respect, highlighting the body of the researcher is not the “answer” necessarily. “One may indeed 
construct a perspective without involving the body. The perspective may be drawn (perhaps only partially) solely from 
a mental process, as the naturalist and theorist of the Umwelt theory, Jakob Von Uexküll, did” Despret, ibid. 55. In 
terms of this dual process of unlearning in order to learn, we might also see analogies between approaches to unlearning 
in performance and those highlighted by ethologists like Shirley Strum who remarks of her efforts to think with 
baboons: “I made a determined effort to forget everything I knew about how baboons are supposed to behave. Instead, I 
tried to let the baboons themselves ‘tell’ me what was important” Strum, Almost Human (New York: Random House; 
1987), 30, emphasis added. 
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–is underpinned by an already given mutuality, whether through communicating bodies or innate 
neurons.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE> 
Figure 4. Sheep Pig Goat, Wellcome Collection and Fevered Sleep. Image by Ben Gilbert for 
Wellcome 
 
 Fevered Sleep’s project––controversially for some (and in ways that were acknowledged as 
ethically problematic by the company themselves)––involved bringing the animals to us, rather than 
us going to them. The performers did not literally put themselves in the (usual) place of the farm 
animals per se; rather, the project transported the animals and performers to a new third place – a 
warehouse in Peckham, albeit one which (as already noted) the company described as trying to be 
as like a barn as possible. And yet, there was some bodily adjustment required for both human 
performers and audience: to the unusual chilly temperatures of the space, but also the requirement 
for the dancers, in particular, to move across floors often scattered not only in hay, but in the 
animals’ urine and faeces (though without, I hasten to add, any opportunity for the animals’ to 
reciprocally observe the human performers’ or audience’s bodily functions!). 
 
 In ethological fieldwork, Despret argues, the ideal is still “that the animals may follow their 
routine as if the human observer was not there. One is the observer, the other the observed.”53 
Fevered Sleep’s Sheep Pig Goat, by contrast, draws attention to the animal as observer; or rather, to 
the reciprocity of observation in human-animal encounters, according to an expanded sense of the 
term “observation,” the etymology of which signals not only acts of watching and looking, but also 
“heeding” or “attending to:” processes that might involve multiple sensory or affective modes.54 
Indeed, given the variable numbers of bodies in the space of the encounters within Sheep Pig Goat 
(sometimes one dancer and two pigs; sometimes four goats and two musicians, plus the presence of 
the two co-directors, the audience), the network of observational processes is complex and multi-
directional as humans and nonhuman animals conduct observations of one another. The etymology 
of observation also suggests links between what it is “to observe” and what it is “to keep safe” or 
“to protect”, inviting consideration of attention as a form of care. For instance, at one moment, the 
older pig “looked out” for the younger, observing and vocally responding to the dancer who had 
																																																								
53 Ibid., 53. 
54 As the film of the project emphasizes, the audience are not detached “observers” either, merely cognitively 
processing the encounters. Rather, we are part of the ongoing process of responsiveness – a source of stimulus for the 
animals (our sounds, smells) and they for us (laughter, disgust). 
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appeared to her to have come too close to them, to intrude on their space. This was a movement that 
mattered from the animal’s point of view.  
 
 In Sheep Pig Goat, the performers aimed to set themselves up as the observed as well as the 
observers; though not always successfully or noticeably so, from a human point of view. That is, as 
Butler suggested, the animals often did not seem that interested in looking at the performers; 
although of course they may have been observing them – observing their observers – and 
responding to them in other ways. Or, to put it another way that recalls the terms of An Infinite Line, 
it is not that the animals were totally indifferent, so much as differently interested. From the point of 
view of human expectations of performance, this unresponsiveness might have been located as a 
problem. If what was sought was a certain kind of contact, communication, or exchange, then 
seeming non-engagement from one party could be framed as a form of failure. And yet, one key 
outcome of this project was the way it allowed animals to mutate the criterion for “success,” or 
transform our understanding of what success might look and feel like in this context (recalling, once 
more, the vocalist Sterre Maier’s description of the sheep’s turned backs as “a moment of sheer 
accomplishment”).55 
 
<INSERT TWO IMAGES SIDE BY SIDE> 
<LEFT: FIGURE 5. RIGHT: FIGURE 6> 
 
Figure 5. Men & Girls Dance, Fevered Sleep. Image by Matthew Andrews 
Figure 6. Sheep Pig Goat, Wellcome Collection and Fevered Sleep. Image by Ben Gilbert for 
Wellcome 
 
 
 
2.3 From performing for to becoming with 
  
So far, to contextualise Sheep Pig Goat, I have touched on Fevered Sleep’s other work with animals 
as well as those of other practitioners engaged in making performances for animal audiences. 
However, it may be just as or even more productive to consider Sheep Pig Goat in the light of some 
of the company’s other projects, such as the much acclaimed Men & Girls Dance (2016), which 
does not involve animals, but has strong similarities with Sheep Pig Goat in other ways. That is, 
Sheep Pig Goat can be framed as an extension to the domain of the interspecies, of a long-standing 																																																								
55 Maier, “Sheep Pig Goat Conversation,” no pagination. 
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concern with the politics and ethics of relationality that the company has hitherto explored in terms 
of human encounters across age and gender divides. Men & Girls Dance, in particular––a devised 
performance co-created by a group of professional male dancers and girls who dance for fun––
could be seen as informing Sheep Pig Goat for a range of reasons. Both begin with an apparently 
unequal pairing: of the adult and the child, of the human and the nonhuman. Both projects create a 
contrast between the representational over-determination of that relationship and the 
unpredictability or creative potential of lived encounters involving individuals. In the case of Men 
& Girls Dance, the company framed the project as responsive to a media context in which they felt 
narratives of sexual abuse and exploitation had come to have not only a disproportionate, but 
damaging bearing on the ways in which men and girls might relate to each other. In the case of 
Sheep Pig Goat, there is less of an emphasis on a single determining story; rather, the individual 
words that were on the wall inside the gathering space within the warehouse, and reappear in the 
short film, point towards the myriad categories, stereotypes, and stories that might serve to organise 
our perception of nonhumans preventing the more creative and reciprocally determining forms of 
encounter I invoked at the start.  
 
In Fevered Sleep’s previous works, there is a notable effort to pursue a consistency of 
process and “product” (or form); or rather, the sense is that the politics of the work lies very much 
in how it was made, and that this process remains visible in the form itself (in terms of the visibility 
of a specific mode of improvisation made possible through the use of task- and game-based 
techniques in Men & Girls Dance, for instance). Though, for the company, one of the exposing 
features of Sheep Pig Goat as a project was the extent to which it opened the research process itself 
to a public audience, without the safety of more structured “content.” That is, whilst Men & Girls 
Dance is a “semi-choreographed, semi-improvised performance”––with aspects co-created anew in 
each locale and with each group of dancers the company work with––Sheep Pig Goat was entirely 
improvised for its duration56. 
 
As noted earlier, Ulrich criticises the anthropocentrism of art works that force animals to 
listen to what humans value as “music.” Does this criticism apply to Sheep Pig Goat? For their part, 
Fevered Sleep emphasize that the animals were invited to act as spectators “on their own terms,” 
which might include choosing to leave the space of the encounters. Likewise, the nature of the 
musicians’ performance was radically different from Kahrs’ work insofar as it was fully improvised 
and ostensibly structured to be responsive to the sounds made by the animals themselves. However, 
the company have reflected on the ways in which the encounters changed over the course of the 																																																								
56 Fevered Sleep, “Men & Girls Dance,” available at https://www.cssd.ac.uk/content/men-girls-dance. 
	 19	
week: becoming “more to do with being together rather than dancing or playing or singing for.  
‘How can you leave a trail of scent for this pig with your breath?’ rather than ‘can you see if this 
sheep will watch you dance?’”57 Is this the beginning of how the animal animalizes performance? 
The performer is, still, performing for the animal, but in a context where performing no longer 
means “dancing or playing or singing” so much as leaving a trail of scent because her audience is a 
being who produces a world where smell means more than sound. Working towards a second 
iteration of the project, which will be held at the Vet School at the University of Surrey in the UK in 
2020, one key difference in the company’s approach might be a change in the “toolkit” they bring 
to the encounters. As David Harradine asks: “If pigs experience the world through scent and touch, 
what should we be bringing into the space to depart from that, rather than departing from our ideas 
of music and dance?  If goats want to play with objects and to climb, how can we work with that?  
What would a sheep, or a horse, or a cow, ‘want’ us to explore with them?”58 
 
Conclusions: Differential continuity in interspecies encounters 
 
“Want” is in scare quotes above for fear of accusations of anthropomorphism in the 
attribution of agency and interests to nonhuman animals. Conventionally, anthropomorphism is 
something one is guilty of: perceived as a kind of stupidity or naïve way of thinking. As Lisa 
Jevbratt recounts, anthropomorphism is “a term uttered with disdain within both scientific and 
humanistic research communities. It is seen as error of sentimentality that makes (objective) 
research impossible.”59 However, it is important to reclaim the concept of anthropomorphism from 
such pejorative and reductive understandings that reinforce assumptions that there are exceptionally 
human characteristics in the first place. In contrast, more recent work in animal studies and new 
materialist discourse has sought to reclaim the value of a kind of expanded anthropomorphism that 
exposes the indeterminate notion of the human to a mutation by animal modes of thought, contra its 
default categorization as “error.” In particular, John Mullarkey encourages thinking in terms of a 
distinction between the “half-anthropomorphism” of unilateral projection (which is usually 
understood to exhaust the concept per se) and  a “complete anthropomorphism” of reciprocal 
mutation.60 Taken up in the context of performance, the former refers to the application of a 
standard humanist form of performance to the animal without any change to the concept itself. In 
																																																								
57 David Harradine in Fevered Sleep and Laura Cull Ó Maoilearca, “On Sheep Pig Goat: An Interview with Fevered 
Sleep”. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Lisa Jevbratt, ‘Interspecies Collaboration – Making Art Together with Nonhuman Animals’, Interspecies 
Collaboration website, 2009, available at jevbratt.com/writing/jevbratt_interspecies_collaboration.pdf , 14. 
60 John Mullarkey, ‘The Animal Line: On the Possibility of a “Laruellean” Non-Human Philosophy’, Angelaki, 19:2 
(2014), 113–29, quote on 119. 
	 20	
the latter, a multilateral and “complete anthropomorphism” expands the meaning of performance in 
the event of interspecies encounter. As Mullarkey suggests, this latter form of perception is not a 
“way of seeing” but “a lived, bodily stance:” a kind of behavioral openness to what performance 
might become rather than measuring the unknown according to extant (human) standards.61 
 
 Likewise, the notion of interspecies empathy is by no means straightforwardly celebrated. It 
raises the charge (like empathy in general) of misguided identification and understanding and 
reinforcing an assumed capacity to access the minds of other animals or to adopt their viewpoints. 
In the particular case of animals, so the criticism goes, what is construed as interspecies empathy is 
in fact mere anthropomorphic projection; no feeling with the animal at all, only a one-way 
projection of my human feelings onto the animal or a misattribution. L.B. Cummings’ emphasis on 
the two-way movement of empathy reconceived as dialogue (or “dialogic empathy”) is important in 
refiguring empathy in performance as an on-going and dynamic process or encounter.62 For 
Cummings, dialogic empathy “does not confuse self with other or rely on analogies. In this kind of 
empathy, all subjects strive to engage one another as equals in an exchange, open to the possibility 
of new thoughts and feelings.”63 
 
For his part, Harradine clearly places great store on both the epistemological and ethico-
political value of embodied empathy and defends it against charges of anthropomorphism (or what 
Mullarkey would call “half-anthropomorphism”): 
I do not empathise with non-humans because I project my human-ness onto 
them and feel for myself in return. With other mammals I feel empathy because 
I see deep anatomical, structural, evolutionary, genetic connections that make it 
possible for me to imagine – momentarily, fleetingly, horrifyingly – some 
version of the world from their point of view. Like a pig I am born in blood and 
pain. Like a pig I drank food from my mother’s body. Like a pig I exist as 
myself and also as part of the social structure which makes me. Like a pig I have 
social relations, and I play these out through vocal communication and in 
complex relationships between individuals. Like a pig I experience fear and pain. 
To feel empathy is not anthropomorphic. It destabilises human exceptionalism in 
hugely important ways.64 
																																																								
61 Ibid., 120. 
62 L.B. Cummings, Empathy as Dialogue in Theatre and Performance (London; New York: Palgrave, 2016), 6. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 David Harradine, Unpublished correspondence with the author, 2018. 
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Such embodied challenges to human exceptionalism and the willingness to perceive continuities 
between humans and nonhuman animals remain key (contra what de Waal identifies as our 
tendency towards “anthropodenial”)65: that is, the genuine practice of an equality for animals or the 
real inclusion of animals within the ethical sphere must be understood beyond the model of an 
expanding circle. In other words, there is a problem if empathy relies on analogy or identification; if 
we can only empathize with animals to the extent that we perceive them to be like “us”: as proven 
to be capable of thought and emotion according to pre-existing human definitions of those 
properties.  
 
 Of course, empathy itself continues to be used to shore up human exceptionalism––despite 
countless counter-arguments seeking to demonstrate non-human instances of empathetic behavior. 
As Cummings discusses, for many contemporary psychologists––as well as those cognitive 
neuroscientists who construe empathy as to some extent “innate” or “hard-wired”––“empathy is the 
path to our greatest potential humanity.”66 Recent work in animal studies has produced countless 
accounts of ways in which nonhumans might not only be included in, but empowered to transform 
our concepts of what empathy is and who is capable of it. Moreover, there is a performative 
contradiction in denying empathy to others in the name of one’s own greater empathy. The paradox 
is undone by seeing or attending to the animal’s behavior as empathy (albeit in a different form): 
according to what philosophers might call a “leap of faith” or “open soul.”67 This would be not a 
discovery of the same – the same capacity for empathy in the animal, for instance – but a discovery 
of what we might call a differential continuity: a kind of mutuality that is not reciprocated in kind 
but can nonetheless recognize a kinship in difference. 
 
At the opening of this article I asked: What can performance contribute to our understanding 
and practice of an ethical approach to knowing nonhuman animals? What constitutes an ethical way 
of knowing nonhuman animals and how do we practice it? To conclude, I propose that, in the first 
instance, the ethical involves a kind of “epistemic justice,”68 acknowledging nonhuman animals as 
																																																								65	Frans B. M. de Waal, “Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in Our Thinking about Humans and 
Other Animals,” Philosophical Topics, 27: 1 (1999), 255-280 
66 Cummings, Empathy as Dialogue, 4. 
67 The notion of the leap of faith comes from Kierkegaard and the open soul from Bergson. I have begun to draw some 
connections between the latter and the work of interspecies performance in a recent publication, see: Cull Ó Maoilearca, 
Laura, “Opening the Circle: Performance philosophy as an animal movement,” Performance Research: On Reflection, 
23:4 (2018), 399–401 
68 The term “epistemic justice” was coined by the British philosopher, Miranda Fricker in 2007 in her book Epistemic 
Iinjustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing where it concerns the refusal to recognise an individual’s capacity as a 
knower. Whilst most engagements with Fricker’s concept are focussed on epistemic injustice towards humans, the idea 
has begun to be extended to nonhuman animals by researchers such as Rebecca Tuvel – the scholar at the center of the 
Hypatia transracialism controversy. See Rebecca Tuvel, Epistemic Injustice Expanded: A Feminist, Animal Studies 
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“knowers” and as living beings who performatively produce and inhabit a point of view that 
constitutes a sensory and perceptual form of worldly knowledge, as much as those produced by 
humans. An ethical approach means confirming that animals have something to teach us about what 
knowledges are and how they are produced, rather than simply measuring animals according to any 
single standard of human knowledge. Secondly, an ethical mode of knowledge production involves 
the reciprocal and dialogic rather than the unilateral. If knowledge-making is forever in process and 
flux, then more ethical modes allow for multi-directional movement, rather than that which is 
imposed by some knowers onto others, or which erases the plurality of worldly knowledges by 
assimilating them into the category of “knowers” but without any qualitative change to the category 
itself.  
 
Theatre and performance, especially in examples like Sheep Pig Goat, can be sites for 
intimate encounters with nonhuman animals that allow for new forms of interspecies 
communication. As Una Chaudhuri has argued, this might suggest that there is something special 
about performance in terms of forwarding our understanding of nonhuman animals. As an art 
focussed on embodied relationality, performance is particularly well equipped to explore non-verbal 
communication across the species barrier supposedly presented by animals’ “lack” of language (or 
what has been construed as the human failure to sufficiently listen to and understand what 
nonhuman animals are already saying).69 And indeed, embodiment has been a key emphasis in this 
article, particularly in terms of distinguishing between the reciprocity of embodied empathy in 
contrast to models of empathy based on unilateral projection and identification. However, the 
duality of the performative process is important to bear in mind in balancing the enthusiasm and 
optimism for performance’s power to create and inhabit new modes of relation to nonhuman 
animals with a reminder of its equal power to reinforce speciesist norms in and through its bodily 
practices. That is, “the animal” is “just” an idea––but no less real and with no less material effects 
on both minoritized human and nonhuman bodies for being such. The superimposed words that 
affectively punctuate the Sheep Pig Goat film enumerate exactly the kinds of ideas that script 
dominant bodily engagements with animals, from the explicitly violent to the well-meaning (but 
perhaps no less problematic as condescending, self-serving, othering). Fevered Sleep’s project 
productively draws attention to this duality of performance by suggesting that improvisational 
techniques from the human arts of dance and music might provide one way to undo some of the 
speciesist and anthropocentric assumptions that live differently in our bodies.  
 																																																																																																																																																																																								
Approach, Doctoral Thesis, 2014, available at: https://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07102014-
161455/unrestricted/Tuvel.pdf	
69 Una Chaudhuri, “‘Of All Nonsensical Things’: Performance and Animal Life”, PMLA, 124:2 (2009), 520–25.	
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Interspecies performance as a field must be understood not only in terms of the performing 
arts and social performance, but as encompassing a continuum of everyday activities and perceptual 
practices that involve varying degrees of repetition and unlearning of “restored behaviors” with 
respect to encounters with nonhumans. The production of subjectivity is always an interspecies 
performance regardless of the extent to which its human participants might acknowledge it as such. 
And yet, even this framing still only tells us one side of the story. To genuinely extend the field of 
performance to include nonhuman animals in meaningful qua transformative ways must also 
involve an openness to how bodies and ideas interact in and as forms of life where thinking, acting, 
and “point of view” take radically differing modalities than those afforded by the still humanist 
confines of the broad-spectrum.  
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Figure 7. Sheep Pig Goat, Wellcome Collection and Fevered Sleep. Image by Ben Gilbert for 
Wellcome 
 
 
 
 
 
